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POLICY CHALLENGE
How can governments tackle climate change while maintaining reasonable
growth, even in the short term? How can they turn on the green innovation
machine? We find that 1. both public intervention and private initiative are in-
dispensable: governments must initially redirect market forces towards clean-
er energy before market forces can take over; 2. climate change policy should
combine a carbon price with high initial clean-innovation R&D subsidies: the
carbon price would need to be
much higher if used alone; 3. poli-
cymakers must act now: delaying
clean innovation policies results in
much higher costs; 4. developed
countries must act as technological
leadersin implementing new envi-
ronmental policies and should
smooth access to new clean tech-
nologies for less-developed coun-
tries.
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SUMMARYThe ‘green growth’ debate is taking place in an oversimplified set-
ting, largely disregarding the innovation factor. Technologies to mitigate cli-
mate change are being treated as given, or as emerging spontaneously,
ignoring the fact that the portfolio of technologies available tomorrow de-
pends on what is done today. This can easily lead to a misguided prefer-
ence, either for subsidising the use of relatively inefficient technologies or
for postponing action to later in the hope that new technologies will be-
come available which will reduce the cost of fighting climate change. But
the radical new emissions-free ‘backstop technologies’ we will need are not
yet available, or else still far from the market. To foster their emergence the
‘green innovation machine’ must be turned on.b
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1. Box 4 sets out the
basic characteristics of
the model. A full ac-
count of the model can
be found in the AABH
(2009) Harvard, MIT,
NBER Working Paper.
1. GREEN GROWTH: ARE WE
KIDDING OURSELVES?
With the reality of climate change
no longer a contentious issue, the
debate has shifted towards the
growth consequences of climate-
change containment. Developing
countries do not want to engage in
environmental policies which they
see as constraining the process of
catching up with more advanced
countries. For their part, the United
States and other developed coun-
tries are reluctant to take any
steps which would jeopardise their
own growth potential. And even in
the European Union – a self-styled
environmental leader – the crisis
has made growth and jobs a higher
priority than before.
Economists have not tackled this
debate very well. Discussion has
mainly revolved around the trade-
off between immediate costs and
long-term benefits of fighting cli-
mate change. The balance be-
tween the two depends upon the
rate at which we should discount
the future. Based on the assump-
tion of a low discount rate, numeri-
cal simulations in the Stern report
(2007) argue for immediate
intervention, whereas other stud-
ies (for example by Nordhaus,
2000) assume higher discount
rates and therefore call for post-
poning intervention.
Current approaches to green
growth are taking place in an over-
simplified setting, largely disre-
garding the innovation factor.
Technologies to mitigate climate
change are treated as given or as
emerging spontaneously, ignoring
the fact that the portfolio of tech-
nologies available tomorrow de-
pends on what is done today. This
perspective can easily lead to a
misguided preference for postpon-
ing action to later in the hope that
new technologies will become
available that will reduce the cost
of fighting climate change in the
future.   
Recent economic simulations (eg
Carraro et al, 2009) confirm that,
in order to keep the costs of miti-
gation and adaptation manageable
and to safeguard reasonable levels
of economic growth,
we need to put into op-
eration a sufficiently
wide portfolio of tech-
nologies as soon as
possible. The range of
technologies we are
talking about includes
traditional renewables
and energy-saving
technologies, which typically re-
quire additional innovation as
higher legal targets and standards
‘bite’, but for the longer term we
also need radical new technologies
– particularly so-called ‘backstop
technologies’ – which are com-
pletely emissions-free. These tech-
nologies are not yet available or
else still far from the market.
Unfortunately, too little has been
done so far to turn on the ‘green in-
novation machine’. In a companion
Bruegel publication (Aghion,
Veugelers and Serre, 2009), we
take a look at the recent perform-
ance of the private green innova-
tion machine. The available
empirical evidence is disappoint-
ing. Despite a recent spurt, only
2.15 percent of total patents ap-
plied for worldwide are environ-
ment-related (2000-06). And with
regard to the diffusion and adop-
tion of green technologies, there is
(too) little happening, particularly
(though not exclusively) in the
field of electricity generation and
distribution, the business sector
accounting for the highest level of
carbon dioxide emissions. 
In this policy brief, we discuss how
government intervention should
be designed in order to effectively
turn on the private green innova-
tion machine, and more generally
to fight climate change, thus
paving the way for ‘green growth’
– the optimum trade-
off between ‘catching’
climate change in
time while maintain-
ing a reasonable rate
of growth, even in the
short term. We build
on new insights from
growth models of in-
novation and the envi-
ronment. In particular, we use the
insights from the model developed
by Acemoglu, Aghion, Bursztyn
and Hemous (2009), henceforth
AABH
1, leading to a new assess-
ment not only of the costs and
benefits of environmental policies
but also of what the optimal tim-
ing, speed and instruments of
intervention should be. 
2. POLICIES TO DIRECT INNOVATION
FOR GREEN GROWTH
In the AABH model, the same
goods can be produced using ei-
ther clean or dirty technologies,
and entrepreneurs typically select
the more profitable of the two, tak-
ing into account the current state
of technology in both and the
(dis)incentives put in place for ei-
ther/both by government. As long
as the dirty technology enjoys an
initial installed-base advantage,
the innovation machine will tend
to work in favour of further improv-
‘Current approach-
es to green growth
are oversimplified,
and largely
disregard the
innovation factor.’NO GREEN GROWTH WITHOUT INNOVATION
b
r
u
e
g
e
l
p
o
l
i
c
y
b
r
i
e
f 03
ing the dirty technology: people
prefer to work at what they already
know, and the clean technology
may never take off at all unless
government opts to intervene.
Governments therefore need to in-
fluence not only the allocation of
production between clean and
dirty activities, but also the alloca-
tion of research and development
between clean and dirty innova-
tion. This means that there are not
one but two major issues that
must be dealt with: the environ-
mental externality generated by
polluting production activities, as
in the standard models, but also
the fact that past or current tech-
nological advances in dirtier tech-
nologies make future production
and innovation in clean technolo-
gies relatively less profitable. 
Such a ‘directed’ technological
change perspective introduces a
new cost-benefit analysis to policy
intervention. The cost of support-
ing cleaner technologies is that
this may slow down growth in the
short run, as cleaner technologies
are initially less advanced. But the
benefit from supporting cleaner
technologies is that it will bring
about greener (and therefore more
sustainable) growth.
2.1WHEN? COST OF DELAYING
INTERVENTION
With directed technological
change, delaying intervention not
only leads to further deterioration
of the environment. In addition,
the dirty innovation machine con-
tinues to build on its lead, thus
making the dirty technologies
more productive and widening the
productivity gap between dirty
and clean technologies even fur-
BOX 1: DELAYING ACTION IS COSTLY
The AABH (2009) model calibrates the cost of delaying intervention.
This cost is computed as the ‘lost’ consumption in each period ex-
pressed as a percentage of the level of consumption which would result
from ‘best-time’ policy intervention.  
Source: Calibrations from the AABH (2009) model
Not surprisingly, the shorter the delay and the higher the discount rate
(ie the lower the value put on the future), the lower the cost will be. This
is because the gains from delaying intervention are realised at the out-
set in the form of higher consumption, while the loss occurs in the fu-
ture through more extensive environmental degradation and lower
future consumption.
Discount rate 1% 1.5%
Lost consumption, delay of 10 years 5.99% 2.31%
Lost consumption, delay of 20 years 8.31% 2.36%
BOX 2: TWO INSTRUMENTS INSTEAD OF ONE
The AABH model allows one to calibrate the cost of using only the car-
bon price instead of a combination of a carbon price and a subsidy to
clean R&D. This cost can be expressed as the amount of ‘lost’ con-
sumption in each period expressed as a percentage of the level of con-
sumption which would result from optimal policy, which involves using
both types of instrument. Using a discount rate of 1 percent, this cost
in terms of lost consumption amounts to 1.33 percent. With a 1.5 per-
cent discount rate, this would increase to 1.55 percent.
An alternative way of showing the higher cost when using only one in-
strument (ie the carbon price), rather than a combination of carbon
pricing and subsidies, is to express how high the optimal carbon price
would have to be when used as a singleton relative to its optimal level
when used in combination. Simulating this scenario in the AABH model
reveals that the carbon price would have to be about 15 times higher
during the first five years and 12 times higher over the following five
years. The intuition behind the initial high differential is that the early
period in particular is key to inducing the catch-up by clean technolo-
gies. Using only the subsidy instrument, while keeping the carbon-
price instrument inactive, would imply that subsidies would have to be
on average 115 percent higher during the first 10 years compared to
their level when used in combination with a carbon price.
ther. This widened gap in turn
means that a longer period is
needed for clean technologies to
catch up and replace the dirty
ones. As this catching-up period is
characterised by slower growth,
the cost of delaying intervention,
in terms of foregone growth, will
accordingly be higher. In other
words, delaying action is costly.
Box 1 illustrates this.2.2 WHICH INSTRUMENTS:
CARBON PRICING AND/OR R&D
SUBSIDIES?
Because there are two problems to
deal with, namely the environmen-
tal one and the innovation one,
using two instruments proves to
be better than using one. The opti-
mal policy involves using (i) a car-
bon price to deal with the
environmental externality
2 and, at
the same time, (ii) direct subsi-
dies to clean R&D (or a profit tax
on dirty technologies) to deal with
the knowledge externality.
Of course, one could always argue
that a carbon price on its own
could deal with both the environ-
mental and the knowledge exter-
nalities at the same time
(discouraging the use of dirty
technologies also discourages in-
novation in dirty technologies).
However, relying on the carbon
price alone leads to an excessive
drop in consumption in the short
run (Box 2). And because the two-
instrument policy reduces the
short-run cost in terms of foregone
short-run consumption, it rein-
forces the case for immediate im-
plementation, even for values of
the discount rate under which
standard models would suggest
delaying implementation (Box 1).
The good news is that government
intervention to trigger green inno-
vation and growth (through pric-
ing carbon and subsidising clean
technologies) can be reduced over
time (Box 3). As soon as clean
technologies have gained suffi-
cient productivity advantage over
dirty technologies, the private in-
novation machine for these clean
technologies can be left on its own
to generate further, even better
and more efficient, clean technolo-
gies. With cleaner technologies in
place, the environmental damage
problem, which the carbon tax is
designed to address, gradually
abates. However, the longer
intervention is delayed, the longer
it will need to be maintained.
2.3 WHICH GOVERNMENTS
SHOULD ACT? MULTILATERAL
VS UNILATERAL INTERVENTION
At the heart of the current environ-
mental debate is the issue of how
to organise worldwide coordina-
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2. A price for carbon to
provide an incentive for
carbon-saving invest-
ments is obtained most
clearly through a car-
bon tax, provided the
tax rate is set suffi-
ciently high and is pre-
dictable in the long
term.  A cap-and-trade
system can achieve the
same result as a tax
but requires a consider-
able amount of informa-
tion and expertise to
get the emission-allo-
cation process right,
creating more room for
error and exposure to
political pressure. In
this policy brief we do
not make an explicit
case for one system
over the other as long
as the system chosen
delivers a carbon price
that succeeds in turn-
ing on the clean innova-
tion machine.
NO GREEN GROWTH WITHOUT INNOVATION
BOX 3: GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION NEED NOT BE PERMANENT 
Simulations with the AABH model indicate how the carbon price and the
clean innovation subsidy should be set optimally over time. Figure 1
shows (i) that subsidies for new clean technologies should be granted
immediately but can be quickly reduced as soon as innovation has
taken off for these technologies; and (ii) that the carbon price can de-
crease over time.  With the emergence of perfectly clean backstop tech-
nologies that have zero emissions, with the innovation gap between
clean and dirty technologies eliminated and the environment rejuve-
nating, the environmental externality gradually disappears, thus reduc-
ing the need for a carbon price over time. Unfortunately, totally clean
technologies will take time to become available, which in turn implies
deferring the phasing out of carbon pricing.
Source:  Calibrations from the AABH (2009) model.  
Results are for a discount rate of 1.5 percent. Taxes are proportional to the price of
the dirty input;subsidies are proportional to the profits derived from clean tech-
nologies. Both are scaled to 100.
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Figure 1: Setting an optimal ‘carrot and stick’tion of policy intervention. As the
benefits of a reduction in CO2
emissions will be global, countries
may be tempted to free-ride, thus
avoiding the costs of intervention,
or in the case of developing coun-
tries to argue that they need first
to catch up economically with the
developed world. But does it mat-
ter if some countries choose not to
intervene to support a switch to
clean technologies? Does it still
pay to intervene unilaterally? And
is it good policy to make one’s own
action conditional upon what com-
mitments other countries make? 
If one tackles the global-action
issue from the perspective of di-
rected technological change, new
light may be shed on how devel-
oped and developing countries
should debate and negotiate the
implementation of a global envi-
ronmental policy
3.
While some emerging countries
such as China and Brazil are
already part of the global innova-
tion machine, most of
the ‘South’, particular-
ly the poorer South,
can at best only imi-
tate/adopt green tech-
nologies previously
invented in the devel-
oped countries - where
these are available at
low cost. Thus if devel-
oped countries direct change to-
wards clean technologies and
subsequently facilitate the diffu-
sion of new clean technologies to
developing countries, a major step
towards overcoming global climate
change can be taken. Indeed it
may not be necessary to price
dirty-input production in the South
in order to avoid a global environ-
mental disaster: unilateral govern-
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3. We focus the discus-
sion on the developed
‘North’ versus the devel-
oping ‘South’, but the
arguments may be ex-
tended to countries at
different stages of de-
velopment among the
countries of the North,
for example to EU mem-
ber states that are still
in the process of
catching up.
4. An equivalent ap-
proach to taxing domes-
tic production and
imposing a carbon tariff
would be to impose a
carbon tax on dirty con-
sumption no matter
where the good comes
from. But this may be
more complicated to im-
plement given the need
to calculate the total
carbon content of con-
sumption. See eg Helm
and Hepburn (2009) for
more on this discussion.
The discussion does not
take into account the
political sensitivities
around border tariffs
and their potential con-
flict with international
trading rules.
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ment intervention in developed
countries can turn on the green in-
novation machine in the North,
which will in turn allow the South
to adopt the cleaner technologies
developed in the North. The greater
the innovation spillovers from
North to South, the more active the
South will be in imple-
menting clean tech-
nologies rather than
dirty ones. Thus, even
in the absence of ac-
tion by developing
countries, a case can
be made for policy
intervention by devel-
oped countries only. A
case can also be made for easing
technology transfer from North to
South and for improving the capac-
ity of the South to effectively ab-
sorb technology from the North.
But what about the international
trade implications of unilateral cli-
mate-change policy? In a free-
trade world, adoption of unilateral
environmental policies – in partic-
ular taxing dirty tech-
nologies – risks
creating a pollution-
haven effect in other
countries or regions
(so-called ‘carbon
leakage’). These coun-
tries will automatical-
ly acquire a
competitive advan-
tage in producing with the dirty
technology, specialising in the pro-
duction of dirty goods which they
can subsequently export to the
rest of the world. Alternatively,
multinational companies may de-
cide to relocate their dirty produc-
tion activities and innovation to
countries taking no action and
then export dirty goods and tech-
nologies to regions that have intro-
duced environmental policies. This
will not only create short-run envi-
ronmental degradation, but will
also deter, or reduce the pace of,
clean technology take-up. 
It is precisely to avoid such per-
verse effects of unilateral environ-
mental policies that
we first advocate a
massive effort to
make clean technolo-
gies available and af-
fordable to poorer
countries. Only to the
extent that clean tech-
nologies are available
at affordable cost
should carbon tariffs – or the
threat of them – come into play.
But where the threat of carbon tar-
iffs is made, it should be made
credibly, as this may help to push
others to emulate such policies
and thus contribute to tackling
what is a global problem
4.
3. DOES CURRENT CLIMATE-
CHANGE POLICY MEASURE UP?
In the light of the preceding dis-
cussion, is current climate-change
policy up to the job? There is some
empirical evidence available on
how the two pivotal policy instru-
ments have been used to date: (i)
carbon prices and (ii) public
spending on green R&D. Here we
briefly summarise the main find-
ings reported in more detail in the
parallel Bruegel publication
(Aghion, Veugelers and Serre,
2009) referred to in section 1,
with an emphasis on the European
Union.
Regarding carbon prices, the evi-
dence shows not only the low level
of carbon taxes in many individual
EU member states but also the
‘Threats of carbon
tariffs should be
credible, as they
may push others to
emulate such 
policies.’
‘It may not be neces-
sary to price dirty-
input production in
the South to avoid
global environmen-
tal disaster.’high dispersion in the level of car-
bon taxes across EU countries,
thus jeopardising their effective-
ness. At EU level, the first phases
of the EU’s Emissions
Trading Scheme (ETS)
have established a
carbon market but
the carbon price is
low, highly volatile
and far from being
predictable in the long
term – a key feature
to incentivise green
innovation. The US
and other major carbon-emitting
countries are even further away
than the EU from establishing an
innovation-inducing carbon price. 
Regarding subsidies to green R&D,
again the evidence shows the poor
performance of the major jurisdic-
tions, particularly the US. Public
R&D spending targeted at the envi-
ronment and energy efficiency
constitutes a very minor share of
total public R&D spending. Not
only are public budgets for such
R&D very limited and uncoordinat-
ed but they are not increasing over
time. Only very recently do we ob-
serve signs of an increase in pub-
lic R&D budgets in some countries.  
Regarding technology transfer to
developing countries, the limited
evidence again suggests that in-
sufficient action is being taken.
Although the UN’s Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM)
framework was designed to trigger
technology transfer, only a limited
number of these projects in fact in-
volve technology transfer. 
4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EU 
There are some signs, particularly
from the venture capital market,
that the private green innovation
machine might be ready to take
off. However, in the absence of the
right push from government this
will be difficult, if not
impossible. What fol-
lows are some game-
changing guidelines
for policy intervention
to turn on the private
green innovation ma-
chine, addressed not
least to EU policymak-
ers:
The carbon price must be high
enough
A first key objective of EU policy
should be to ensure that the price
of carbon is set at an appropriate-
ly innovation-inducing level. This
involves improving the European
cap-and-trade system, ensuring
that the mechanism generates a
sufficiently high and durably pre-
dictable carbon price. As part of
the EU’s climate-change package,
it is planned to make the EU’s ETS
more consistent and
predictable in future. It
should, however, be
designed more explic-
itly to play a role in di-
recting technological
change. In addition,
the EU should play a
more active role in co-
ordinating the carbon
tax policies of individ-
ual EU member states in order to
ensure an EU-wide carbon price.
Vigorous backing for green
technology
The EU should stimulate new tech-
nologies more vigorously by (i)
subsidising the diffusion of exist-
ing green technologies; (ii) in-
creasing public funding for green
basic R&D, particularly for re-
search into radical new backstop
technologies, through the EU’s
R&D Framework Programme and
other funding; (iii) coordinating
member states’ individual re-
search programmes on climate
change and involving non-EU part-
ners. The receipts from carbon
pricing can be used to finance re-
search and development subsi-
dies. This support should leverage
the private innovation machine
and thus be reduced as soon as
these technologies come on
stream. Particularly in the short
term when we are still anticipating
better technological alternatives
to be available in the future, sup-
port schemes for currently avail-
able technologies should be
time-consistent in order to avoid
creating excessive gaps for new,
more radically clean technologies
to fill that are still in the pipeline.
Joined-up green regulation
The EU should coordi-
nate on clear and
time-consistent green
regulations, standard-
setting and public pro-
curement among
member states, there-
by ensuring a large, in-
tegrated EU output
market for green in-
vestments. Also, com-
petition policy and single-market
instruments should be used to en-
sure a more integrated and con-
testable EU-wide electricity
generation and distribution mar-
ket that is more able to absorb
new, cleaner technologies.
Act globally
b
r
u
e
g
e
l
p
o
l
i
c
y
b
r
i
e
f 06
NO GREEN GROWTH WITHOUT INNOVATION
‘Public R&D spend-
ing for the environ-
ment and energy
efficiency consti-
tutes a very minor
share of total public
R&D spending.’
‘A first key objective
of EU policy should
be to ensure that the
price of carbon is
set at an appropri-
ately innovation-
inducing level.’b
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BOX 4: THE STANDARD MODEL VERSUS THE DIRECTED TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE MODEL 
The standard approach: Nordhaus
The neoclassical DICE model of Nordhaus is often used for evaluating the costs and benefits of environmen-
tal policy (or of the absence of it). In this framework, a consumption good is produced using capital and
labour, and the productivity of these factors depends both upon a knowledge parameter which grows exoge-
nously over time, and upon environmental quality. The environment is itself negatively affected by tempera-
ture, temperature increases with the emission of carbon dioxide, and the emission of carbon dioxide
increases with production.
Environmental policy takes the form of a tax on CO2 emissions, which induces firms to reduce emissions but
at the cost of also reducing production. Delaying policy intervention thus increases production and therefore
consumption in the short run, but at the cost of environmental degradation which in turn calls for higher
abatements (and therefore higher consumption reduction) in the future. In the DICE model, an input tax or a
cap-and-trade policy brings about the optimal outcome. And unless we assume a low discount rate as in the
Stern report (2007), immediate intervention is not optimal.
A new paradigm: AABH
Acemoglu, Aghion, Bursztyn and Hemous (2009), or AABH, develop a new paradigm where productivity
growth is not exogenous but instead results from innovation. The main features and conclusions of the model
can be summarised as follows. A consumption good can be produced using a clean and/or a dirty input, ac-
cording to
where εis the elasticity of substitution between the clean and dirty inputs (we assume that ε> 1 so the two
inputs are substitutable).
Only the production of dirty inputs harms the environment 
where ξis the environmental degradation caused by dirty-input production and δis the regeneration rate.
The environment in turn affects the utility of people.
Inputs Yjare produced with labour Ljand machines xjiof quality  according to
Initially the average quality of dirty machines Adis higher than the average quality of clean machines Ac.
Continued...
The EU should take a leading role
on the international stage by de-
veloping a roadmap for establish-
ing an international,
innovation-inducing carbon price.
This roadmap would include inter-
national linkage of the cap-and-
trade systems of major players
and would remove barriers to trad-
ing permits across different sys-
tems. At the same time, the EU
should advocate and promote the
development of an equitable fi-
nancing scheme for climate-
change action by less-developed
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Innovation can improve the efficiency of production of either type of inputs.  Innovation results from the work
of scientists who can try to improve either the quality of dirty machines or the quality of clean machines. More
specifically the average quality of machines in sector jwill grow according to
where sjiis the fraction of innovators directing their research to sector jat time t, ηjis the probability of suc-
cess in developing a new technology in sector j, and γis the ‘size’ of an incremental innovation. This structure
reflects the effect of ‘building on the shoulders of giants’, namely technological advances in one sector make
future advances in that sector more effective.
Innovators will direct their efforts to the sector jwhere the expected profits from innovation IIjtare the high-
est, where IIjtis proportional to Ajt.
Where the dirty technology enjoys an initial installed-base advantage, the innovation machine will work in
favour of the dirty technology. The clean technology may never take off unless the government intervenes.
The laissez-faire equilibrium will lead to environmental disaster. Where the dirty technology is based on ex-
haustible resources, this may help to prevent such a disaster, as the dirty technology is eventually priced out
of the market. But even in this case, the innovation machine left on its own works sub-optimally, favouring
the dirty technology for too long.
A critical parameter for the effectiveness of policy intervention is the extent to which the dirty and the clean
technology are substitutable. If the clean technology is not a good substitute for the dirty technology and en-
vironmental degradation has already progressed substantially, government intervention, even when de-
signed optimally, may no longer be able to prevent environmental disaster.
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